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Reply to Giere

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Janet A. Kourany
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Abstract

In his “A New Program for Philosophy of Science?”, Ronald Giere expresses qualms regarding the critical and political projects I advocate for philosophy of science—that the critical project assumes an underdetermination absent from actual science, and the political project takes us outside the professional pursuit of philosophy of science. In reply I contend that the underdetermination the critical project assumes does occur in actual science, and I provide a variety of examples to support this. And I contend that the political project requires no more than what other academic fields even in science studies are already providing.

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Reply
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Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , January 2003 , pp. 22 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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