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The Reemergence of ‘Emergence’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Bryon Cunningham
Bryon Cunningham*
Affiliation:
Emory University
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, 1461 Rock Springs Circle, #2, Atlanta, GA 30306; email: [email protected].
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Abstract

A variety of recent philosophical discussions, particularly on topics relating to complexity, have begun to reemploy the concept of ‘emergence’. Although multiple concepts of ‘emergence’ are available, little effort has been made to systematically distinguish them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of higher-order properties that (inter alia) distinguishes three classes of emergent properties: (1) ontologically basic properties of complex entities, such as the mythical vital properties, (2) fully configurational properties, such as mental properties as they are conceived of by functionalists and computationalists, and (3) highly configurational/holistic properties, such as the higher-level patterns characteristic of complex dynamical systems. Or more simply: emergence as ontological liberality, emergence as multiple realizability, and emergence as interactive complexity.

Type
Metaphysics and Methodology of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S62 - S75
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Pacific A.P.A., 2000. Special thanks to Robert N. McCauley and Amy Coplan for their comments and support.

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