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Reduction in Genetics—Biology or Philosophy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

David L. Hull
David L. Hull*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
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Abstract

A belief common among philosophers and biologists alike is that Mendelian genetics has been or is in the process of being reduced to molecular genetics, in the sense of formal theory reduction current in the literature. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are numerous empirical and conceptual difficulties which stand in the way of establishing a systematic inferential relation between Mendelian and molecular genetics. These difficulties, however, have little to do with the traditional objections which have been raised to reduction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , December 1972 , pp. 491 - 499
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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