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A Recent Drawing of the Theory/Observation Distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Peter K. Machamer
Peter K. Machamer*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
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Extract

James Cornman has recently offered a definition for ‘observation term’ which he takes to meet most, if not all, of the standard objections to such definitions. He also employs this definition against certain materialists, but in what follows I wish only to address myself to the proposed definition. I shall argue that he has failed to show any logical difference between “observation terms,” as he defines them, and terms which are not so classified. I shall show that his definition is too restrictive.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , September 1971 , pp. 413 - 414
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

[1] Cornman, J., “Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 35, No. 1, 1968, pp. 45–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Harré, R., Theories and Things, London; Sheed and Ward, 1961.Google Scholar
[3] Maxwell, G., “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. III (eds. Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G.), University of Minnesota Press, 1962.Google Scholar