Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely on unsubstantiated interpretations of some results from experimental psychology. I raise two objections to the argument: (i) even if it is advantageous to use rational strategies, it does not follow that we actually use them; and (ii) natural selection need not favor only or even primarily reliable belief-forming strategies.
A version of this paper was read at the 1985 meeting of the Central Division of the APA. Robert Richardson gave helpful comments. I would like to thank Earl Conee, Peter Markie, Mark Stone, and Ed Wierenga for their comments on drafts of the paper.