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Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Bas C. van Fraassen
Bas C. van Fraassen*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto and University of Southern California
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Abstract

A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment (governing change of state), and the family of possible epistemic inputs (deliverances of experience). First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information (rational corpus) and a recipe that determines the accepted epistemic judgments on the basis of this corpus. Through an examination of several approaches to the statistical syllogism, a relation is again established with Jeffrey's generalized conditionalization.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 165 - 187
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1980

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Footnotes

†

Research for this paper was supported by NSF grant SOC78-08464. I also acknowledge gratefully correspondence and discussions with Dorling, Giere, Harper, Jeffrey, Kyburg, Levi, Lewis, Salmon, Seidenfeld, Williams, and Zanotti, and the helpful comments made by Domotor on the penultimate draft. Since the correct representation of the views of some authors turned out to be a delicate matter, I emphasize that even when I associate ideas with their names, the connection was suggestive, and I am solely responsible for the shortcomings.

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