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Quinn on Duhem: An Emendation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Nancy Tuana
Nancy Tuana*
Affiliation:
University of California—Santa Barbara
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Extract

In recent years there has been a rebirth of interest in the philosophy of Pierre Duhem. Although I applaud the spirit of this movement, one finds the critics of Duhem frequently lacking in a basic understanding of Duhem's tenets, sometimes to the extent that one doubts a familiarity with the Duhemian text. One of the few papers which is designed to remedy this state of affairs is that of Philip Quinn entitled “What Duhem Really Meant.” Quinn is to be applauded for his meticulous and rigorous exegetical work on the Duhemian text. Unfortunately, Quinn's characterization of the logical relations of two of the central Duhemian theses is erroneous. I shall endeavor to correct these errors in this paper.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 456 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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References

[1] Duhem, P. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Trans. Wiener, . New York: Antheneum, 1974.Google Scholar
[2] Grünbaum, A. Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, 2nd ed. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XII. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Harding, S. (ed). Can Theories Be Refuted? Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Laudan, L. “Grünbaum on ‘The Duhemian Argument’.” Philosophy of Science 32 (1965): 295–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Quinn, P. “What Duhem Really Meant.” in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. XIV. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969. pp. 33–56.Google Scholar