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Quine, Synonymy and Logical Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Robert Barrett
Robert Barrett*
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Abstract

W. V. O. Quine's well-known attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is held to affect only one of the two species of analytic statements he distinguishes. In particular it is not directed at and does not affect the so-called logical truths. In this paper the scope of Quine's attack is extended so as to embrace the logical truths as well. It is shown that the unclarifiability of the notion of ‘synonymy’ deprives us not only of “analytic statements that are obtainable from logical truths by the replacement of synonyms with synonyms” but of “logical truths” themselves.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , October 1965 , pp. 361 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © 1965 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

[1] Quine, W. V. O., “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review, January, 1951.Google Scholar
[2] Quine, W. V. O., “Truth By Convention,” Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead, O. H. Lee, (Ed.), New York, 1936.Google Scholar
[3] Quine, W. V. O., “Logical Truth,” American Philosophers at Work, S. Hook, (Ed.), New York, 1956.Google Scholar
[4] Quine, W. V. O., “Carnap and Logical Truth,” The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. A. Schilpp, (Ed.), LaSalle, Ill., 1963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar