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Progress: Metaphysical and Otherwise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert Wachbroit
Robert Wachbroit*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy
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Abstract

Realism about progress–that progress consists in the obtaining of some metaphysical relation between a sequence of theories and the world–is often thought to be required by realism about the representational character of theories. The purpose of this paper is to show how one can be a realist about theories without being a realist about progress. The result is a view that cannot be at odds with what the history of science shows.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 354 - 371
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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