Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T04:11:49.405Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Paul M. Quay
Paul M. Quay*
Affiliation:
Saint Louis University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It is argued that two aspects of the progress of mature science characterize, at least in combination, no other fields; hence, that these aspects can usefully serve as a demarcation criterion. Scientific progress is: (1) cumulative, regardless of crisis or revolution, from the viewpoint of concrete applications; (2) capable of unrestricted growth towards universal coerciveness of argument and evidence. Before these aspects of progress are discussed, some clarifications are made and corrections offered to Kuhn's view of the nature of scientific progress across revolutions; afterwards, the suggested criterion is used to distinguish, concretely, various fields from science. Finally, it is shown that the “style” of scientific progress is not a useful demarcation criterion.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , June 1974 , pp. 154 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

[1] Chandrasekhar, S. “Stochastic Problems in Physics and Astronomy.” Reviews of Modern Physics 15 (1943).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Clark, S. J. and Clark, J. T. “The Physiognomy of Physics.” in Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Edited by Colodny, R. G. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. Pages 276–291.Google Scholar
[3] Feller, W. An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications. vol. 2. (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley, 1971. Chapters 12, 18.Google Scholar
[4] Hanson, N. R. The Concept of the Positron. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Pages 135–165.Google Scholar
[5] de Klerk, J. “Elastic surface waves.” Physics Today 25, 11 (1972): 32–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Knox, R. Enthusiasm: a chapter in the history of religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950.Google Scholar
[7] Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.Google Scholar
[8] Kuhn, T. S. “Comment.” Comparative Studies in Philosophy and History 11 (1969): 403–412Google Scholar
[9] Kuhn, T. S. “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pages 1–23.Google Scholar
[10] Kuhn, T. S. “Reflections on my Critics.” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pages 213–278.Google Scholar
[11] Maxwell, N. “A Critique of Popper's Views on Scientific Method.” Philosophy of Science 39 (1972): 131–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[12] Price, D. J. de Solla, Science since Babylon. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961. Chapter V.Google Scholar
[13] Quay, P. M. “A Distinction in Search of a Difference: the Psycho-social Distinction between Art and Science.” The Modern Schoolman 51 (1974): 345–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[14] Rosenthal, R. “Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.” Psychology Today. September, 1968: 47–51.Google Scholar
[15] Truesdell, C. A. and Noll, W. The Non-Linear Field Theories of Mechanics. In Encyclopedia of Physics. Vol. III/3. Edited by S. Flugge. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1965.Google Scholar
[16] Weinberg, A. M. Reflections on Big Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1967.Google Scholar
[17] Wigner, E. P. “The Limits of Science.” In Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 94 (1950): 422.Google Scholar