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The Presupposition Theory of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Arthur W. Burks
Arthur W. Burks*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Extract

1. Introduction. It is generally admitted that a large part of man's knowledge is based on inductive arguments. Hence any philosophical theory concerning the nature of inductive arguments constitutes an epistemological theory. Any such philosophical theory of induction must, if it is to be satisfactory, take adequate account of Hume's criticism of inductive arguments. One way of treating his criticism is to say that the validity of inductive arguments is in an important sense relative to some broad factual assumptions about the general nature of the universe and that these general factual assumptions are presupposed in a certain way by the users of inductive arguments (8, 10). Let us call any theory of this general type a postulate theory of induction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , July 1953 , pp. 177 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © 1953, The Williams & Wilkins Company

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Footnotes

1

This is an expanded and somewhat revised version of a paper written while the author was Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago and read at a joint meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association and the History and Philosophy of Science Section of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December, 1951.

References

(1) Burks, Arthur W., “Reichenbach's Theory of Probability and Induction,” Review of Metaphysics 4 (1951)377–393.Google Scholar
(2) Burks, Arthur W., Review of Carnap's Logical Foundations of Probability. The Journal of Philosophy 48(1951)524–535.Google Scholar
(3) Burks, Arthur W., “The Logic of Causal Propositions,” Mind 60(1951)363–382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(4) Carnap, Rudolf, Logical Foundations of Probability.Google Scholar
(5) Finetti, de, “La Prévision: Ses Lois Logique, Ses Sources Subjectives,” Annals de l'Institule Henri Poincaré 7(1947)1–68.Google Scholar
(6) Feigl, Herbert, “De Principiis Non Disputnndum …?”, Philosophical Analysis (Edited by Max Black), pp. 136, 148.Google Scholar
(7) Keynes, J. M., A Treatise on Probability, pp. 305, 313.Google Scholar
(8) Margenau, Henry, The Nature of Physical Reality, Chapter 5.Google Scholar
(9) Ramsey, Frank, “Truth and Probability” and “Further Considerations,” in The Foundations of Mathematics.Google Scholar
(10) Russell, Bertrand, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, Part VI.Google Scholar
(11) Carnap, Rudolf The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Google Scholar