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A Pragmatic Analysis of Idealizations in Physics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

William F. Barr
William F. Barr*
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Cortland
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Abstract

A brief discussion is offered of what it means to say that a set of statements provides D-N explanation with special emphasis given to approximative D-N explanation. An idealized theory is seen to provide approximative D-N explanation. An ideal case provides explanation only if postulates are offered which connect the ideal antecedent condition with actual conditions. Such postulates will help in accounting for deviations between what the consequent of the ideal case entails and what actually occurs. Three ways are presented for deciding on the acceptability of idealizations: (i) as actual conditions more closely approximate the ideal antecedent conditions specified in an ideal case, the more closely actual cases ought to approximate the consequent of the ideal case; (ii) the additional postulates connecting ideal antecedent conditions with actual conditions ought to account for deviations between what is entailed by an idealized theory and what actually occurs ; and (iii) an idealized theory is explained by a more general theory when certain state variables in the more general theory are given extreme values. It is argued that (iii) is not a necessary condition for the acceptability of idealizations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , March 1974 , pp. 48 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The preparation of this paper was supported by a Faculty Research Fellowship from the State University of New York.

References

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