Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T13:21:16.344Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Population Genetics and Population Thinking: Mathematics and the Role of the Individual

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Margaret Morrison
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Ernst Mayr has criticised the methodology of population genetics for being essentialist: interested only in “types” as opposed to individuals. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that “he who does not understand the uniqueness of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection” (1982, 47). This is a strong claim indeed especially since many responsible for the development of population genetics (especially Fisher, Haldane, and Wright) were avid Darwinians. In order to unravel this apparent incompatibility I want to examine the possible sources and implications of essentialism in this context and show why the kind of mathematical analysis found in Fisher's work is better seen as responsible for extending the theory of natural selection to a broader context rather than inhibiting its applicability.

Type
The Making of the Genetical Theory of Evolution
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 1189 - 1200
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

Support of research by the SSHRC is gratefully acknowledged.

References

Fisher, Ronald Aylmer ([1911] 1976), “Heredity, Comparing the Methods of Biometry and Mendelism”, paper read to Cambridge University Eugenics Society. Reprinted in B. J. Norton and E.S. Pearson, “A Note on the Background to, and the Refereeing of, R. A. Fisher’s 1918 Paper ‘On the Correlation of Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance’”, Notes and Records of the Royal Society 31:151–162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisher, Ronald Aylmer (1918), “The Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance”, The Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance 52:399–433.Google Scholar
Fisher, Ronald Aylmer, and Stock, C. S. (1915), “Cuenot on Pre-adaptation: A Criticism”, Cuenot on Pre-adaptation: A Criticism 7:46–61.Google Scholar
Galton, Francis (1889), Natural Inheritance. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Mayr, Ernst (1973), “The Recent Historiography of Genetics”, The Recent Historiography of Genetics 6:125–154.Google ScholarPubMed
Mayr, Ernst (1982), The Growth of Biological Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pearson, Karl (1898), “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution: On the Law of Ancestral Heredity”, Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution: On the Law of Ancestral Heredity 62:386–412.Google Scholar
Pearson, Karl (1902), “On the Fundamental Conceptions of Biology”, On the Fundamental Conceptions of Biology 1:320–344.Google Scholar
Pearson, Karl (1909), “On the Ancestral Gametic Correlations of a Mendelian Population Mating at Random”, On the Ancestral Gametic Correlations of a Mendelian Population Mating at Random 81:25–29.Google Scholar
Pearson, Karl (1911), The Grammar of Science, 3rd ed. London: Black.Google Scholar
Pearson, Karl (1930), The Life, Letters, and Labours of Francis Galton, 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sober, Elliott (1980), “Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism”, Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism 47:350–383.Google Scholar