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Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupré and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1998
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I would like to thank Giovanni Camardi, Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Hasok Chang, Richard Creath, Michael Davis, John Dupré, Stuart Glennan, Gerald Holton, David Hull, Philip Kitcher, Bob Ladenson, Greg Mikkelson, Alan Richardson, Jessica Riskin, Warren Schmaus, Jack Snapper, David Stump, Thomas Uebel, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions about earlier versions of this paper.
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