Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
This paper distinguishes and critiques several forms of pluralism about the levels of selection, and introduces a novel way of thinking about the biological properties and processes typically conceptualized in terms of distinct levels. In particular, “levels” should be thought of as being entwined or fused. Since the pluralism discussed is held by divergent theorists, the argument has implications for many positions in the debate over the units of selection. And since the key points on which the paper turns apply beyond this specific issue, the paper may prove of general interest in thinking about the metaphysics of science
An early and brief version of this paper was presented at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association meeting in Edmonton in October 2000, and at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting in Quebec City in May 2001. I thank my respective commentators, Jim Brown and David Castle, and audiences for their feedback on these occasions. Some of the ideas in the final sections of the paper were informally bruited at a meeting of the Science and Humanities Circle at the University of Alberta in January 2002, and I thank participants there, especially Alex Rueger, for some feedback. Special thanks also to Michael Wade for some valuable written comments on a draft, and for drawing my attention to some of the recent biological literature; and to two referees for Philosophy of Science, one of whom drew my attention to the recent work of Kerr and Godfrey-Smith, for their particularly astute comments.