In their adversely critical attitude towards administrative agencies, many lawyers and judges disclose a distrust of the expert, the specialist. That distrust is curious, for the position of our profession in society rests on the fact that we ourselves are specialists.

In the famous colloquy (perhaps partly apocryphal) which is said to have occurred about three hundred years ago between King James I and Judge Coke, the King remarked that, if “law was founded upon reason, he and others could reason as well as the judges,” and Coke loftily replied that lawsuits “are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgement of the law, which law is an art that requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.” The King, an intelligent amateur, was angered, for doubtless he saw that, as McIlwain observes, “if ... the law was to be supreme, at the same time a mystery open only to the initiated, it is clear that, if the claim of the lawyers were to be admitted, the supreme authority would be their exclusive possession.” Demos, now King, sometimes echoes James’ anger at the idea of a government of lawyers, not of men.