Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T05:09:09.490Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Physicalism, the Identity Theory, and the Doctrine of Emergence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

John Kekes
John Kekes*
Affiliation:
San Fernando Valley State College
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I Physicalism, and the weak identity theory deny, while physicalism2 and the radical identity theory assert, that raw feels can be accomodated in a purely physicalistic framework.

II A way of interpreting the claim of physicalism1 is that raw feels are emergents.

III The doctrine of emergence asserts that: (i) there are different levels of existence, (ii) these levels of existence are distinguishable on the basis of the behaviour of entities of that level, and (iii) an adequate scientific explanation of a lower level is inadequate for a higher level.

IV The criteria of emergence are novelty and a priori unpredictability.

V Either qualities or laws or both may be regarded as emergents.

VI If the alleged impossibility of explaining higher level phenomena on the basis of explanation adequate for lower level phenomena is logical, then the impossibility is either trivial or it implies indeterminism.

Consideration of theories of emergence:

  • VII Semantic emergence. On this view emergence is theory-bound, analogous to indefinability or indemonstrability.

  • VIII Methodological emergence. On this view what we regard as emergents depends on the theory we construct.

  • IX Nomological emergence. On this view emergence is an empirical problem.

Conclusion: if there are emergents, physicalism2 and the radical identity theory probably have to be abandoned. However, unless actual examples of emergents are produced both theories hold. The logical possibility of falsification is not an objection against physicalism2 and the radical identity theory; it is one of their merits.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , December 1966 , pp. 360 - 375
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1966

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

[1] Broad, C. D., ‘Mechanism and Its Alternatives’, pp. 43–94, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, I.L.P.P.S.M. Routledge, 1925.Google Scholar
[2] Feigl, H., ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”‘, pp. 377–87, 413–16, 419–38, 445–65, 470–78, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, ed. Feigl, H. et al., Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958.Google Scholar
[3] Goudge, T. A., ‘Another Look at Emergent Evolution’, Dialogue, 1965, Vol. 4, pp. 273–285.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Henle, P., ‘The Status of Emergence’, Journal of Philosophy, 1942, Vol. 39, pp. 486–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Lovejoy, A. O., ‘The Meanings of “Emergence” and Its Modes’, Proc. of the Sixth Int. Congress of Phil., London, 1927.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Meehl, P. A. & Sellars, W., ‘The Concept of Emergence’, pp. 239–52, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, ed. Feigl, H. et al., Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1956.Google Scholar
[7] Morgan, L. C., Emergent Evolution, London, 1923.Google Scholar
[8] Nagel, E., ‘The Doctrine of Emergence’, pp. 366–80, The Structure of Science, Routledge, 1961.Google Scholar
[9] Oppenheim, P. & Putham, H., ‘Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’, pp. 3–29, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, ed. Feigl, H., et al., University of Minnesota Press, 1958.Google Scholar
[10] Pap, A., ‘The Concept of Absolute Emergence’, Brit. J. for the Phil. of Science, 1952, Vol. 2, pp. 302–311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[11] Pepper, S. C., ‘Emergence’, Journal of Philosophy, 1926, Vol. 23, pp. 241–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[12] Schlesinger, G., 'The Principle of Simplicity“, pp. 8–44, Method in The Physical Sciences, I.L.P.S.M. Routledge, 1963.Google Scholar
[13] Sellars, W., 'The Myth of the Given“, Science, Perception and Reality, I.L.P.S.M. Routledge, 1963.Google Scholar
[14] Smart, J. J. C., ‘Physics and Biology’, pp. 50–63, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, I.L.P.S.M. Routledge, 1963.Google Scholar
[15] Smart, J. J. C., ‘The Secondary Qualities’ and ‘Consciousness’, pp. 64–105, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, I.L.P.S.M. Routledge, 1963.Google Scholar