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Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Justin Sytsma
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Abstract

Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers hold not only that it is but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 5 , December 2009 , pp. 958 - 969
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Edouard Machery, Ken Schaffner, and the audience at the 2008 PSA biennial meeting for their helpful comments.

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