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Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
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To contact the author, please write to: University of Pittsburgh, Department of Philosophy; e-mail: [email protected].
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