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A Paradox for Empiricism (?)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Igor Douven
Igor Douven*
Affiliation:
University of Leuven
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Abstract

According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism yields a better account of science than does scientific realism. One particularly important advantage van Fraassen claims his position to have over scientific realism is that the former can make sense of science without invoking (what he calls) pre-Kantian metaphysics. In the present paper the consistency of van Fraassen’s position is put in doubt. Specifically, it will be argued that van Fraassen faces the paradox that he cannot do with nor without the pre-Kantian metaphysics he abhors.

Type
Realism and Anti-Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3 , 1996 , pp. S290 - S297
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Research for this paper was supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), which is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Ton Derksen, Katherine Hawley, Leon Horsten, Robert Nola, Herman Roelants, Jaap van Brakel and Bas van Fraassen for helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper.

‡

Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium.

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