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Our Certainty of Other Minds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Ray H. Dotterer*
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.

Extract

In a recent number of Philosophy of Science, Mr. C. D. Hardie offers some interesting suggestions concerning the problem of other minds. In his view the fact that we feel certain of their existence constitutes a problem; and he wishes to find a rational justification for this certainty. “What grounds have I for believing in the existence of other minds?” he asks. He is attracted by the traditional argument from analogy, but finds it incomplete; for “any conclusion arrived at by analogy and induction is at best only probable,” and “I am certain that other minds exist.” Again we find him remarking that “there is room for an account which (1) makes our knowledge of them depend in some way on analogy ... but which (2) is such that we can be certain that other minds exist. ...” (page 311)

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1940

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References

1 Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 309-317.