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Ontology Schmontology? Identity, Individuation, and Fock Space
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
The aim of this paper is modest. It is argued that if the nature of the “equivalence” between first-quantized particle theories and second-quantized (Fock Space) theories is examined closely, if the inadequacies of de Muynck's “indexed particle” version of Fock Space are recognized, and if the question is not begged against modal metaphysics, then van Fraassen's attempted deflation of ontological issues in quantum theory can be seen to fail.
- Type
- Quantum Field Theory, Bell's Theorem, and Hidden Variables
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1343 - 1356
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
My thanks to Arthur Fine, Laurie Brown, Paul Teller, and Steven French for comments on an earlier version of this paper.