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On Two Aspects of Eliminative Materialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Theodore Guleserian*
Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside

Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Cornman, J. W., “Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 35, No. 1, 1968.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Cornman, J. W., “On the Elimination of ‘Sensations’ and Sensations,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 22, September, 1968.Google Scholar
[3] Feyerabend, P. K., “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. III, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962.Google Scholar
[4] Feyerabend, P. K., “Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 17, September, 1963.Google Scholar
[5] Feyerabend, P. K., “Comment: Mental Events and the Brain,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60, (May 23, 1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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[7] Rorty, R., “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 19, (September, 1965).Google Scholar
[8] Guleserian, T., “Contemporary Materialism and Epistemological Values,” forthcoming in International Philosophical Quarterly, (September, 1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar