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On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Juha T. Saatsi
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Abstract

The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.

Type
Realism and Underdetermination
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1088 - 1098
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I want to thank Angelo Cei, Steven French, and Scott Shalkowski for helpful comments, and Philip Good for sparking the initial interest to the topic.

References

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