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On Species Individualism: A New Defense of the Species-as-Individuals Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Keith A. Coleman  and
E. O. Wiley
Keith A. Coleman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy
E. O. Wiley
Affiliation:
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology and Natural History Museum, The University of Kansas
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Abstract

We attempt to defend the species-as-individuals hypothesis by examining the logical role played by the binomials (e.g., “Homo sapiens,” “Pinus ponderosa”) in biological discourse about species. Those who contend that the binomials can be properly understood as functioning in biological theory as singular terms opt for an objectual account of species and view species as individuals. Those who contend that the binomials can in principle be eliminated from biological theory in favor of predicate expressions opt for a predicative account of species and view species as kinds. We contend that biologists' talk about species is talk about species as individuals, and we conclude that the most plausible account of species is an objectual account.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue 4 , December 2001 , pp. 498 - 517
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

†

Reprints requests to: E. O. Wiley, Natural History Museum, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045; email [email protected].

‡

We gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to Darrell Frost, David Hull, Philip Kitcher, and Elliott Sober, all of whom kindly reviewed earlier drafts of the present manuscript. Thanks also to one anonymous reviewer who suggested that we introduce the term “historical set” in our analysis of Kitcher's position.

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