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On Mushroom Individuality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Dan Molter
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Abstract

Genidentity coupled with material continuity is proposed as a minimum conception of biological individuality, and then theoretical individuation is employed to identify multiple kinds of biological individuals in a single example from mycology, a patch of chanterelle mushrooms. Of the many candidate materially continuous genidenticals found in a mushroom patch, only those with functional roles in biological theory are notable as biological individuals. Evolutionary and physiological theories pick out multiple kinds of functional individuals in mushrooms, so a pluralistic account of mushroom individuality is warranted.

Type
Biology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 1117 - 1127
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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