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On Internal Structure, Categorical Structure, and Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2022

Neil Dewar Open the ORCID record for Neil Dewar [Opens in a new window]
Neil Dewar*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

If categorical equivalence is a good criterion of theoretical equivalence, then it would seem that if some class of mathematical structures is represented as a category, then any other class of structures categorically equivalent to it will have the same representational capacities. Hudetz (2019a) has presented an apparent counterexample to this claim; in this note, I argue that the counterexample fails.

Type
Discussion Note
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 90 , Issue 1 , January 2023 , pp. 188 - 195
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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