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On Global Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

C. A. Hooker
C. A. Hooker*
Affiliation:
The University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

Contrary to the Empiricist model of science, successful sufficiently fundamental theories not only fit and unify their data fields but also prescribe the general terms in which relevantly to describe observation; specify what is and is not observable; specify the conditions under which what is observable, is observable; specify the instrumental means and reliability by which what is measurable is measured; specify what is causally, statistically, and merely accidentally connected. Moreover, such theories typically require all or most of the entire remainder of science to be properly applied in any given situation and theoreticians' models play a crucial role in such applications. (I call these respectively the internal and external globalnesses of theories.) A discussion of the consequences of these global features of theories for philosophy of science is offered in the context of specific examples and a structural model for science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , June 1975 , pp. 152 - 179
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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