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On a Supposed Methodological Difference Between the Natural and Social Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Mary K. Vetterling*
Affiliation:
Boston University

Extract

Various grounds for methodological differences between the natural and social sciences have been suggested in recent philosophical literature. It is said, for example, that the natural sciences deal with verifiable hypotheses, “exact” findings, measurable phenomena and invariable observations, whereas the social sciences do not. One of the most plausible of all such contentions is the suggestion that the natural sciences produce theories which correctly predict future events, whereas in the social sciences, there are cases in which correct prediction of future events is, in principle, impossible. If such a case is to be found in the social sciences, it must, of course, be further demonstrated that an analogous case is not to be found in the natural sciences. If such a case is not to be found in the social sciences, the contention rests unverified.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Scriven, M.An Essential Unpredictability in Human Behavior.” in Scientific Psychology. Edited by Wolman, Benjamin B. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965. Pages 414415.Google Scholar
[2] Suppes, P.Discussion: On an Example of Unpredictability of Human Behavior.” Philosophy of Science 31 (1964): 143.10.1086/287991CrossRefGoogle Scholar