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On a Matter of Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

G. Schlesinger
G. Schlesinger*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina
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Extract

In [2] I have presented a sketch of a principle which I suggested was powerful enough to enable us with its aid to solve a number of well known problems in the philosophy of science. James Moor in [1] expresses the opinion that my principle is too strong so as to be destructive and proposes instead a considerably watered down alternative which may be used for constructive purposes only. I shall deal here with his two major objections only and show that on a careful enough analysis it becomes evident that he has not raised any difficulties for my principle.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 1978 , pp. 312 - 317
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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References

[1] Moor, J. “The Cancelation of Symmetrical Contraries and the Principle of Significant Contradictories,” Philosophy of Science 43 (1976): 550–560.10.1086/288712CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Schlesinger, G. Confirmation and Confirmability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.Google Scholar