Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-grxwn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-10T22:21:34.767Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses: The Case of the Top Quark

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Kent W. Staley
Kent W. Staley*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of “use novelty” introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philosophically, in terms of the need to conduct a severe test than in terms of use novelty. Nevertheless, a historical factor remains in the assessment of some evidence claims.

Type
Confirmation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3 , 1996 , pp. S248 - S255
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am grateful for the support of a grant-in-aid from the Friends of the Center for History of Physics, American Institute of Physics, which made possible the oral history interviews that provided material for this paper. Tapes of my interviews with CDF and DO members will soon be available at the AIP’s Niels Bohr Library. I am also indebted to Peter Achinstein and Bruce Barnett for helpful discussions.

‡

Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.

References

Abe, F., et al. (1994), “Evidence for Top Quark Production in pbar-p Collisions a √s = 1-8 TeV.” Physical Review D 50, 2966–3026.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abe, F., et al. (1995), “Observation of Top Quark Production in pbar-p Collisions with the Collider Detector at Fermilab.” Physical Review Letters 74, 2626–31.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Achinstein, P. (1991), “Theory, Experiment, and Cathode Rays” in Particles and Waves: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Abe, F., et al. (forthcoming), “Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?” in D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. Burian (eds.), PSA 1994, Vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binkley, M. (1995), Interview by author. Tape recording. Fermilab, Batavia, Illinois, October 19, 1995.Google Scholar
Gerdes, D. (1995), Interview by author. Tape recording. Fermilab, Batavia, Illinois, October 6, 1995.Google Scholar
Incandela, J. (1995), Interview by author. Tape recording. Fermilab, Batavia, Illinois, October 16, 1995.Google Scholar
Mayo, D. (1991), “Novel Evidence and Severe Tests” Philosophy of Science 58, 523–552.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayo, D. (1996). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Musgrave, A. (1974), “Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shochet, M. (1995), Interview by author. Tape recording. University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, October 17, 1995.Google Scholar
Worrall, J. (1985). “Scientific Discovery and Theory-Confirmation”, in Pitt, J. (ed.), Change and Progress in Modern Science. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 301–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Worrall, J. (1989), “Fresnel, Poisson and the White Spot: The Role of Successful Predictions in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories”, in Gooding, D., Pinch, T., and Schaffer, S. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–157.Google Scholar
Zahar, E. (1973), “Why Did Einstein's Programme Supercede Lorentz's?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24, 96-123, 223–262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar