Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Mathematics is often taken to play one of two roles in the empirical sciences: either it represents empirical phenomena or it explains these phenomena by imposing constraints on them. This article identifies a third and distinct role that has not been fully appreciated in the literature on applicability of mathematics and may be pervasive in scientific practice. I call this the “bridging” role of mathematics, according to which mathematics acts as a connecting scheme in our explanatory reasoning about why and how two different descriptions of an empirical phenomenon relate to each other. I discuss two bridging roles appearing in biological and physical explanations.
I am very grateful to James Robert Brown, Laura Franklin-Hall, Franz Huber, Nicolas Fillion, Neil Dewar, Mario Günther, and three anonymous reviewers for very helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank audiences at the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science in Vancouver and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science in Durham for valuable discussions and suggestions.