Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T08:15:59.031Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

In this discussion note, we explain how to relax some of the standard assumptions made in Garber-style solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence. The result is a more general and explanatory Bayesian approach.

Type
Discussion Note
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

We would like to thank Fabrizio Cariani, Vincenzo Crupi, Kenny Easwaran, Aidan Lyon, Jan Sprenger, Mike Titelbaum, and two anonymous referees of this journal for useful feedback and comments on this article.

References

Earman, John. 1992. Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Garber, Daniel. 1983. “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.” In Testing Scientific Theories, ed. Earman, John, 99132. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Hartmann, Stephan. 2014. “A New Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.” Unpublished manuscript, PhiSci Archive. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10887/.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard. 1992. “Bayesianism with a Human Face.” In Probability and the Art of Judgment, 77107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roseveare, N. T. 1982. Mercury’s Perihelion from Le Verrier to Einstein. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Salmon, Wesley. 1989. “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, ed. Wesley Salmon and Philip Kitcher, 3–219. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Skyrms, Brian. 1980. “Higher Order Degrees of Belief.” In Prospects for Pragmatism, ed. Mellor, D. H., 109–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sprenger, Jan. 2015. “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.” Philosophy of Science 82 (3): 383401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar