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Nash, Bargaining and Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Justin P. Bruner
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Abstract

Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. Evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes that the positions of those involved are entirely symmetric. I consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. I also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.

Type
Biological Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 1185 - 1198
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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