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Must Reasons be Rational?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Janet Levin
Janet Levin*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those that we ourselves use. I then propose some conditions that are considerably weaker, and argue that they fulfill the descriptive and explanatory requirements of intentional ascription.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 1988 , pp. 199 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am greatly indebted to Ed McCann, Brian Loar, and Hartry Field for many helpful conversations about these issues, and comments on various drafts of this paper. I am grateful to Jonathan Bennett for many valuable comments and suggestions as well. An early version of the paper was read at U.C. Irvine, in October, 1985. This work was partially supported by a grant from the USC Faculty Research and Innovation Fund.

References

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