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The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Elliott Sober
Elliott Sober*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Abstract

Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , December 1999 , pp. 542 - 564
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.

‡

My thanks to Martin Barrett, John Beatty, Tom Bontly, Ellery Eells, Berent Enç, Branden Fitelson, Jerry Fodor, Martha Gibson, Daniel Hausman, Dale Jamieson, Andrew Levine, Brian Mclaughlin, Terry Penner, Larry Shapiro, Chris Stephens, Richard Teng, Ken Waters, Ann Wolfe, and an anonymous referee for this journal for comments on earlier drafts.

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