Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism. In this article, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone's account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals with autism and argue that they are best explained by positing a higher-level, domain-specific ToM module.
I wish to thank Edouard Machery and Arthur Falk for extensive comments on a draft of this article. Also, I thank Philip Gerrans for his feedback, Shannon Bernard-Adams for many conversations about clinical practice and Autism Spectrum Disorder, and the audience at the 2010 PSA meeting in Montréal.