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Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Arnon Levy
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Abstract

Some philosophers of science—myself included—appeal to fiction as an interpretation of the practice of modeling. This raises the specter of an incompatibility with realism, since fiction making is essentially nontruth regulated. I argue that the prima facie conflict can be resolved in two ways, each involving a distinct notion of fiction and a corresponding formulation of realism. The main goal of the essay is to describe these two packages. I comment also on how to choose between them.

Type
Fictions, Models and Representation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 5 , December 2012 , pp. 738 - 748
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For oral and written comments I am indebted to Mauricio Suarez and Martin Thomson-Jones.

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