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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extensive and profound as philosophic speculation on the nature of knowledge may have been during the last twenty-five centuries, it must be conceded that it has, on the whole, failed in its undertaking. In fact, we do not seem to be much closer to the solution of the epistemological problem than were Kant and Hegel or, for that matter, Plato and Aristotle. Obviously enough, the problem should now be approached in some new way, perhaps one growing out of recent scientific findings.
1 Critique of Pure Reason, tr. M. Mueller, ed. 1919, p. 100.
2 R. B. Winn, “The Distinction between Truth and Knowledge,” The Personalist, XIV. 3.
3 “A Preface to Logic,” The Monist, XLI. 2.
4 See my “The Nature of Relations,” Philosophical Review, L. 1.
5 Battle of Behaviorism, 15
6 Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, I, 191.
7 B. Gibson, “The Problem of Freedom in Its Relation to Psychology,” in Personal Idealism, a Symposium.
8 A. D. Ritchie, The Natural History of the Mind, 139.
9 Traité des sensations, pt. 3.
10 “Final Observations,” Journal of Philosophy, XXXVIII, No. 9.
11 Scientific Thought, 267.
12 Gestalt Psychology, 234.
13 The Foundations of Psychology, 136.
14 The Field of Psychology, 356.
15 Principles of General Psychology, 204.
16 The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion, 396.
17 “What Is Knowledge?” The Scientific Monthly, March, 1943.