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Methodology of Modern Physics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Henry Margenau
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Extract

Methodology might be understood to mean a description of various individual procedures which have led to the successful solution of specific problems. In studying the subject of physics from this point of view, i.e. with special emphasis on method, one would naturally turn his attention to the traditional divisions of experimental and theoretical physics, the former with its measuring devices and the latter with its mathematical technique. In no other sense than this does the term methodology make any direct appeal to the working physicist, and if you would ask him to define his methods he would probably answer with a description of experimental technique or the methods of setting up and solving differential equations. His answer would tell you how he solves his problems, but hardly how he finds them and why he solves them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , January 1935 , pp. 48 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1935

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References

1 As presented in the work of Mill, Jevons, Russell, Keynes.

2 E.g., by A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World.

3 Matter is a datum, but mass is a construct in the sense here advocated.

4 See for instance E. Mach, Science of Mechanics; R. B. Lindsay, Physical Mechanics.

5 This is contrary to the view expressed by P. W. Bridgman in The Logic of Modern Physics. See, however, H. Dotterer, Monist, 44, 231, 1934.

6 N.B. We do not question the possibility of measuring its charge or its mass, etc.!

7 This happens to be true; for if we allow the states of the constructs to develop under the influence of a light wave the distribution of frequencies in the spectral line changes in accordance with the initial rules of association between constructs and data. For instance, if the exposure to the light wave is short, the absorption line is broad; if it is long, the line is narrow. But it is important to observe that in this instance a constructional state does not determine a datum directly, but a probability distribution among data. This, however, is not contrary to the principles outlined above, which do not require the rules of association to be point for point direct.

8 It is unfortunate, perhaps, that one must use such stilted language to convey ideas clearly. In simply saying: Caloric is a form of matter, we are guilty of logical confusion. The construct caloric is not the datum matter, nor a form of it. The trouble is that the word matter has a double meaning: 1) that of a datum, 2) that of a construct (collection of massive particles, fluid). Common speech, being developed on practical concerns, rarely realizes epistemological distinctions.

9 Whether we regard states as a third class of constructs (beside systems and quantities) or whether we look upon them as associations of systems and quantities is a matter of practical indifference.

10 Cf. H. Margenau, Phil. of Science, 1, 133 (1934).

11 Cf. for instance Poincaré's example of astronomers who can not observe the longitude of a planet. The Foundations of Science, p. 111 et seq.

12 Ref. 10.