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Methodological Solipsism and Explanation in Psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
This paper is a discussion of the tenability of methodological solipsism, which typically relies on the so-called Explanatory Thesis. The main arguments in the paper are directed against the latter thesis, according to which internal (or autonomous or narrow) psychological states as opposed to noninternal ones suffice for explanation in psychology. Especially, feedback-based actions are argued to require indispensable reference to noninternal explanantia, often to explanatory common causes. Thus, to the extent that methodological solipsism is taken to require the truth of the Explanatory Thesis, it, too, can be regarded as untenable.
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- Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I wish to thank those who read earlier versions of this paper. I benefited especially from the comments of Dr. George Berger, Prof. Jay Garfield, and an anonymous referee for this journal.
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