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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
The function of Metaphysics is to furnish an intelligible and significant perspective. The tendency of recent speculation is to abstain from the attempt to give a total or absolute perspective of the world as a unit—there is some question as to whether we can think of the world as a whole—but rather to understand the objects about us, to bring values, formerly located in a transcendental realm, into life and conduct here and now, and to broaden our understanding and interests to included related activities and other communities. To make our perspective within a single science intelligible it is necessary, as Professor Miller has demonstrated, to fill in the gaps between perceptual objects with inexperienceable “interphenomena” and to employ methodological concepts and principles derived by abstraction and inference. Then again, each of the special sciences selects certain aspects of the general perspective for intensive research leaving gaps between the sciences to be filled in by integrating concepts. Finally, values emerge at the various levels, and these need to be related to the conditions out of which they arise and to the fields of applied knowledge in which they function.
1 G. H. Mead, Philosophy of the Act, Chicago: 1938, pp. 626–627.
2 David L. Miller, “Metaphysics in Physics.” In this issue.
3 Chicago, 1945.
4 John Dewey, Experience and Nature. Chicago: 1926, p. 324.
5 G. H. Mead, Philosophy of the Present. Chicago: 1932, pp. 111–112.
6 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. New York: 1929, p. 113.
7 Ibid., p. 124.
8 G. H. Mead, Op. cit., p. 39.
9 Whether Mead would have been reassured as to the direction of Whitehead's metaphysics by the study of Process and Reality we can only surmise. My guess is that his anticipations would have been confirmed.