Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists should revise some significant details of the program, particularly the conception of theories, to circumvent this more potent Davidson-inspired worry.
An earlier draft of this essay was presented at the Mid-South Philosophy Conference in April 1990. I thank participants for helpful comments and discussion. Special thanks are extended to Brad Petrie, who commented on the paper at the conference, and to David Henderson and Terence Horgan, who offered written comments on the earlier draft.