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Meaning as Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Y. H. Krikorian*
Affiliation:
College of the City of New York

Extract

Meanings have an empirical genesis and status. This simple claim has often been denied or ignored. Some metaphysicians in their exaltation of the eternal have regarded meanings as essences, or eternal objects, or neutral entities, in a subsistential or supernatural realm that is changeless and has no roots in nature. Some logicians in their zest to manipulate meanings isolate them so completely as forms of reason, or as syntactical symbols that at no point is their connection with natural events made intelligible. Yet meanings, all meanings, have relation to mind. It is this empirical, psychological aspect of meaning that I shall analyze. The larger philosophic question as to what the relation of the psychological aspect is to the metaphysical or the logical will not concern us except indirectly.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1941

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References

1 General Theory of Value, p. 313.

2 Body and Mind, p. 311.

3 Logic, p. 109

4 Mind, Self, and Society, p. 75-76.