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Massive Modularity, Content Integration, and Language

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Collin Rice
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Abstract

One of the obstacles facing massive modularity is how a pervasively modular mind might generate non-domain-specific thoughts by integrating the content produced by various domain-specific modules. Peter Carruthers has recently argued that the operations of the language faculty are constitutive of the process by which the human mind is able to integrate content from heterogeneous conceptual domains. In this article, I first argue that Carruthers's data do not provide support for either of two possible interpretations of his thesis. In addition, I provide empirical and theoretical reasons for thinking content integration is performed external to the language faculty.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 800 - 812
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would especially like to thank Philip Robbins for his invaluable encouragement and comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Peter Carruthers, Daniel Weiskopf, Zac Ernst, and Tyler Kasperbauer for comments on earlier versions of this work. In addition, I am indebted to André Ariew and Randall Westgren for their continued support. This research was partially supported by the Al and Mary Agnes McQuinn Chair in Entrepreneurial Leadership.

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