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Marr's Computational Theory of Vision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patricia Kitcher
Patricia Kitcher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego
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Abstract

David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the “hegemony of neurophysiology view”, the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I consider what the phenomenon of vision must be like for Marr's project to succeed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , March 1988 , pp. 1 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For valuable discussions about various issues in this paper, I am grateful to Jay Goldman, Philip Kitcher, Joseph Owens, Mary C. Potter, William Thompson, and Albert Yonas. I am also grateful to three referees whose criticisms and suggestions led me to make a number of needed revisions.

References

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