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Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Colin Howson  and
Allan Franklin
Colin Howson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics
Allan Franklin
Affiliation:
Department of Physics University of Colorado
*
†Send reprint requests to Allan Franklin, Department of Physics, Campus Box 390, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309.
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Abstract

Maher (1988, 1990) has recently argued that the way a hypothesis is generated can affect its confirmation by the available evidence, and that Bayesian confirmation theory can explain this. In particular, he argues that evidence known at the time a theory was proposed does not confirm the theory as much as it would had that evidence been discovered after the theory was proposed. We examine Maher's arguments for this “predictivist” position and conclude that they do not, in fact, support his view. We also cast doubt on the assumptions of Maher's alleged Bayesian proofs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 1991 , pp. 574 - 585
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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