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Logic: Normative or Descriptive? The Ethics of Belief or a Branch of Psychology?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael D. Resnik
Michael D. Resnik*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Abstract

By a logical theory I mean a formal system together with its semantics, meta-theory, and rules for translating ordinary language into its notation. Logical theories can be used descriptively (for example, to represent particular arguments or to depict the logical form of certain sentences). Here the logician uses the usual methods of empirical science to assess the correctness of his descriptions. However, the most important applications of logical theories are normative, and here, I argue, the epistemology is that of wide reflective equilibrium. The result is that logic not only assesses our inferential practice but also changes it. I tie my discussion to Thagard's views concerning the relationship between psychology and logic, arguing against him that psychology has and should have only a peripheral role in normative (and most descriptive) applications of logic.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 221 - 238
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful for the comments I have received from Alan Berger, Robert Brandon, Richard Burian, Stephen Darwall, Susan Haack, Alan Hanen, Larry Laudan, William Lycan, John Post, Joe Pitt, Jay Rosenberg, Stewart Shapiro, Lance Stell, and Stephen Stich. Versions of this paper have been read at Davidson College, Duke University, the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and Virgina Polytechnic Institute and State University.

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