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The Limits of Physicalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patricia A. Ross
Patricia A. Ross*
Affiliation:
Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota
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Abstract

Mark Wilson, in his 1985 paper entitled “What Is This Thing Called ‘Pain‘?: The Philosophy of Science Behind the Contemporary Debate,” proposed an account of physicalism that departs significantly from standard approaches. One of the main points of his paper was to explain the flaws in arguments claiming that psychological properties cannot be shown to be physical because of their functional nature. However, the positive proposal that Wilson makes in this article bears further examination. I argue that it not only resolves many problems that have grown up around the topic of physicalism, but that the proposal itself should make us radically rethink some important philosophical questions, especially those concerning explanation and property identification.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 94 - 116
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Center for Philosophy of Science, 355 Ford Hall, 224 Church St. S.E., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

‡

This paper began as a chapter of my Ph.D. thesis. I would like to thank my advisor, Allen Stairs, and Jeffrey Bub for their help and guidance. I would also like to thank David MacCallum and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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