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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Benjamin Anders Levinstein
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Abstract

Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue that (1) agents should minimize the expected inaccuracy of their beliefs and (2) inaccuracy should be measured via the Brier score. They show that in certain diachronic cases, these claims require an alternative to Jeffrey Conditionalization. I claim that this alternative is an irrational updating procedure and that the Brier score, and quadratic scoring rules generally, should be rejected as legitimate measures of inaccuracy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 3 , July 2012 , pp. 413 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Alex Anthony, Nick Beckstead, Branden Fitelson, Irwin Levinstein, Richard Pettigrew, Brian Weatherson, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and discussion.

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